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ATMOSPHERIC HARMS IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
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I. THE ATMOSPHERICS OF PROPOSITION 8
`

Given the rhetoric that surrounded the Proposition 8 initiative campaign to ban

recognition of same-sex marriages in California, it is easy to forget that less was at stake than
may have appeared. Because same-sex couples may formalize their relationship as “domestic
partners” to whom state law provides all of the rights and privileges of legally married spouses,1
the issues raised by Proposition 8 did not include whether same-sex couples in California do or
should have all of the rights and privileges of married heterosexual spouses–that train had already
left the station, as the California Supreme Court made abundantly clear.2 For the same reason,
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See CAL. FAM. CODE § 297.5(a) (“Registered domestic partners shall have the same
rights, protections, and benefits, and shall be subject to the same responsibilities, obligations, and
duties under law, whether they derive from statutes, administrative regulations, court rules,
government policies, common law, or any other provisions or sources of law, as are granted to
and imposed upon spouses.”).
2

See Strauss v. Horton, Nos. S168047, S168066 & S168-78, slip op. at 92-93, 2009 WL
1444594, at *46 (Cal. May 26, 2009).
Proposition 8 does not eliminate the substantial substantive protections afforded to
same-sex couples by the state constitutional rights of privacy and due process as
interpreted in the majority opinion in the Marriage Cases. Rather, same-sex couples
continue to enjoy the same substantive core benefits afforded by those state constitutional
rights as those enjoyed by opposite-sex couples-including the constitutional right to enter
into an officially recognized and protected family relationship with the person of one's
choice and to raise children in that family if the couple so chooses-with the sole, albeit
significant, exception that the designation of “marriage” is, by virtue of the new state

Proposition 8 did not implicate the question whether extending the rights and privileges of
marriage beyond heterosexual couples will undermine or otherwise change the importance and
function of marriage–those rights had already been extended, and so that train had also already
departed.
What was at stake in Proposition 8 was the definition of normality, and thus the question
of social acceptability. Are same-sex relationships sufficiently “normal” that same-sex couples
should be able to legally formalize their relationships, if they so choose, in the way that
heterosexual intimate relationships have been formalized for millennia? Or are such
relationships sufficiently outside the norm to justify reserving the term “marriage” solely for
heterosexual couples, even if the rights and privileges held by heterosexual “spouses” and
homosexual “partners” are identical?
These are not trivial questions. There will always be a social asterisk attached to samesex couples until those who wish to can call themselves “spouses” rather than “partners”; that
this difference is legally inconsequential does not obscure that it is socially and culturally

constitutional provision, now reserved for opposite-sex couples. Similarly, Proposition 8
does not by any means “repeal” or “strip” gay individuals or same-sex couples of the very
significant substantive protections afforded by the state equal protection clause either
with regard to the fundamental rights of privacy and due process or in any other area,
again with the sole exception of access to the designation of “marriage” to describe their
relationship. Thus, except with respect to the designation of “marriage,” any measure that
treats individuals or couples differently on the basis of their sexual orientation continues
to be constitutionally “suspect” under the state equal protection clause and may be upheld
only if the measure satisfies the very stringent strict-scrutiny standard of review that also
applies to measures that discriminate on the basis of race, gender, or religion.
Id.
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significant.3 And if (or when) that day comes, religious conservatives will have a more difficult
time teaching distinctive principles of moral right and wrong and otherwise holding themselves
apart from the world, even though–heated pro-8 rhetoric aside–they will not be required to
endorse or to accept, let alone to perform, same-sex marriages in their churches, sanctuaries, and
private social groups.4
Nevertheless, I want to suggest that the harm suffered by gays and lesbians whom
Proposition 8 implicitly labels “abnormal,” like the harm of “normalizing” same-sex orientation
and conduct from which the Proposition has (for now) saved religious conservatives in
California, is different in kind than harm stemming from state denial of legal rights and
privileges. I call this harm “atmospheric,” suggesting that the harm stems from the social or
cultural environment in which one lives, but does not block his or her exercise of constitutional,
civil, or other legal rights, or otherwise deprive him or her of life, liberty, or property, as these
have been traditionally understood.
II. WHAT IS AN “ATMOSPHERIC” HARM?
Atmospheric harms are social or cultural abstractions rather than violations of legal
rights. An atmospheric harm is a kind of emotional weight that one carries, consisting in the
knowledge that one’s essential identity or core beliefs or practices are not approved by the
majority, but also not prohibited or penalized or even regulated by it. Atmospheric harms are

3

Cf. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (recognizing the stigma of racially
segregated public schools even when segregated schools provide a genuinely equal education).
4

Cf. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (permitting Amish parents to withdraw
their children from high school attendance so as to facilitate the intergenerational preservation of
their distinctive religious community).
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frequently verbalized as harms to “society” or “the community” or “the country,” in that the
relevant society or community or country is, to use a common expression, “sending the wrong
message.” By accepting or rejecting certain persons or behavior as normal, “the community”
implicitly communicates its view of right or wrong, even when it tolerates dissenters from that
view.5 But this rhetoric betrays that atmospheric harms are really individual, though frequently
voiced as communal: It is the weight of contrary community norms on individual dissenters from
those norms, though unaccompanied by legal consequences, that constitutes the harm, rhetoric to
the contrary notwithstanding.
Atmospheric harms are distinct from aesthetic offenses. A harm stemming from behavior
that one believes is wrong is atmospheric because the apparent acceptance of the behavior
implied by the absence of sanctions alters the social or cultural environment in which such
persons live, not because one finds the behavior disgusting or unattractive. Plenty of folks
believe that same-sex relationships or heterosexual condemnation of them are distasteful, but
normalization of such relationships or condemnations would constitute an atmospheric harm to
such persons only if the normalization or condemnation also negatively affected the social or
cultural environment in which they live.
For example, opposition to same-sex marriage by many religious conservatives seems
motivated by the purported threat that such marriage poses to a traditional contrary
conceptualization of marriage which lies at the theological core of many conservative religions.
(Again, this seemed especially the case in the Proposition 8 campaign because of the apparent
5

By “toleration” I intend its classic sense of the government’s permitting the practice of
minority religions that it believes are wrong, rather than its more contemporary sense of the
government’s granting equal respect and protection to all religions, majority and minority alike.
-4-

equation of domestic partner rights and privileges with those stemming from civil marriage.)
The purported harm, in other words, is not that same-sex marriage will interfere with whether or
how religious conservatives themselves enter into or act within traditional such marriages,6 but
rather that permitting gays and lesbians to marry will change the social meaning of marriage in
ways that religious conservatives would not find congenial, which would make traditional
6

Not that such arguments weren’t made. Perhaps the least credible argument offered in
support of Proposition 8 was the suggestion that in its absence, religions that oppose same-sex
marriage on theological grounds would nevertheless have been required to solemnize same-sex
marriages in their sanctuaries, temples, and other places of worship. There is no credible
constitutional argument that would support such a result, and even the most currently aggressive
interpretations of state public accommodation statutes do not end in a legal requirement that
religions opposed to same-sex marriage must perform or permit such marriages in their places of
worship. See Joint Statement of California. Constitutional Law Professors (n.d.) (statement of 60
constitutional law professors at California law schools concluding that there is no basis for the
claim that legalization of same-sex marriage would require churches to perform or to permit the
performance of same-sex marriages in buildings reserved for worship), available at Frank D
Russo, Constitutional Law Professors Reject Arguments Made by California Proposition 8
Proponents,
<http://www.californiaprogressreport.com/2008/10/constitutional_1.html> (last visited Mar. 4,
2009).
Marginally more credible was the argument that without Proposition 8, churches opposed
to same-sex marriage would lose their California state tax exemptions. While this is conceivable
in theory, cf. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States (1983) (upholding revocation of federal tax
exempt status of religious university unaffiliated with a church on ground that university’s
theological opposition to interracial marriage and dating violated public policy), it is very
unlikely in practice, see Joint Statement, supra (statement of 60 constitutional law professors at
California law schools concluding that “no church’s tax-exempt status will be affected by its
decision whether to solemnize marriages between same-sex couples”). For example, no church
with an all-male priesthood has been threatened with loss of its tax exempt status for gender
discrimination, notwithstanding well-established state and federal public policies condemning
such discrimination. It seems unlikely that the policies on which exempt status rests would
dictate revocation of exempt status in case of sexual-orientation discrimination, but not gender
discrimination.
In any event, neither of these purported consequences of Proposition 8 would have
constituted a merely atmospheric harm, because each of them would have required an affirmative
action (solemnizing a marriage) or imposed a tangible penalty (loss of tax exempt status).
-5-

marriage more difficult to perpetuate or to promote as a social and cultural practice.7
7

One of the most credible pro-8 arguments concerned the atmospherics of public
education. Public education teaches to the norm, and it would have been inevitable, had
Proposition 8 been defeated, that same-sex marriage would have been normalized in all
educational contexts to which sexuality and marriage are now relevant. Religious conservatives
viewed this as a serious potential harm, but it would have been an atmospheric one: The children
of religious conservatives may well have been expressly taught, or the public school curriculum
may have implicitly assumed, that same-sex marriage is part of the California social norm, but
neither they nor their parents would have been required to endorse, to act out, or otherwise to
approve of this norm, nor would parents have been prevented from teaching their children a
morality at home or at church that departs from it, cf. Meyer v. Nebraska 262 U.S. 390 (1923)
(recognizing substantive due process right of parochial school instructor to teach, and of parents
to provide for their children to be taught, a foreign language), or from enrolling their children in
private schools that do not teach to this norm, see Pierce v. Soc. of Sisters 268 U.S. 510 (1926)
(recognizing substantive due process right of Roman Catholic order to provide, and of parents to
satisfy compulsory school attendance laws by choosing for their children, private religious
education). Of course, in the long run harms that initially are purely atmospheric may become
more tangible, as the underlying value they reflect becomes widely and deeply embedded in the
culture, which then displays a decreased inclination to tolerate dissenting views.
Another credible pro-8 argument concerned the fear that adoption and other social
welfare agencies operated by religions opposed to same-sex marriage would not have been able
to adhere to beliefs and practices opposing same-sex marriage in placing children or otherwise
providing services. Compare Patricia Wen, Catholic Charities stuns state, ends adoptions; gay
issue stirred move by agency, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 11, 2006 (reporting decision of Boston
diocese to withdraw its Catholic Charities affiliate from adoption work because of state law
prohibiting discrimination against same-sex adoptive parents),
<http://www.boston.com/news/local/articles/2006/03/11/catholic_charities_stuns_state_ends_ad
options/> (last visited June 9, 2009) with An Act Implementing the Guarantee of Equal
Protection under the Constitution of the State for Same-Sex Couples, Conn. Pub. Act No. 09-13
§§ 17-19 (Apr. 23, 2009) (exempting religious individuals, clergy, and organizations from
obligation to perform, recognize, or provide goods, services or accommodations in connection
with the solemnization or celebration of a same-sex marriage where doing so would violate their
religious beliefs),
<http://www.cga.ct.gov/2009/ACT/PA/2009PA-00013-R00SB-00899-PA.htm> (last visited June
10, 2009) and An Act to End Discrimination in Civil Marriage and Affirm Religious Freedom,
Maine Pub. L., ch. 82, LD 1020, item 1 § 3 (124th Legislature, 1st session, May 6, 2009)
(providing that the same-sex marriage statute “does not authorize any court or other state or local
governmental body, entity, agency, or commission to compel, prevent, or interfere in any way
with any religious institution’s religious doctrine, policy, teaching or solemnization of marriage
within that particular religious faith’s tradition,” as guaranteed by the free exercise provisions of
the Maine Constitution and the First Amendment),
-6-

III. ATMOSPHERIC HARMS IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
A.

In General
There are hints at the legitimacy of atmospheric harms in constitutional doctrine. One of

the most famous (and controversial) passages of Brown v. Board of Education is its conclusion
that separating racial minorities from other children in the public schools solely on the basis of
their race “generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect
their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone.”8 This suggested that the harm of

<http://www.mainelegislature.org/legis/bills/bills_124th/chapters/PUBLIC82.asp> (last visited
June 10, 2009).
A possible compromise would exempt the nonprofit activities of religions and their
members from laws that prohibit sexual orientation discrimination, while leaving for-profit
activities subject to such laws. Cf. Corporation of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327
(1987) (holding that as applied to nonprofit activities of religious organizations, statutory
exemption of religious organizations from antidiscrimination laws does not violate Equal
Protection or Establishment Clause); id. at 342-44 (recognizing that religiously restrictive
employment practices are part of a religious organization’s free exercise right of self-definition,
and that use of the nonprofit character of an activity as a bright-line rule to determine whether it
is deserving of free exercise protection avoids entangling the Court in theological questions)
(Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment); see also Ira Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Question &
Answer: A Clash of Rights? Gay Marriage and the Free Exercise of Religion, The Pew Forum
on Religion and Public Life (May 21, 2009) (observing that “when individuals enter the
commercial market as employers or sellers, their federal constitutional right of freedom of
religion is significantly limited”), <http://pewforum.org/events/?EventID=216> (last visited June
9, 2009).
The application of anti-discrimination laws to religious social service agencies might
entail more than purely atomospheric harm, in that it would likely require religious social service
agencies to act in a way that implies approval of same-sex marriages–for example, when such
laws compel a religious adoption agency to place a child with a same-sex married couple despite
the belief of its affiliated or sponsoring religion that such marriages are morally wrong.
8

347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954); cf. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (holding that
maintenance of a diverse learning environment is a compelling state interest justifying racial
preferences in higher education admissions).
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segregation to African American schoolchildren was not only their confinement to state facilities
and services that were not truly equal to those afforded whites, “separate but equal”
notwithstanding, but also the condescending or hostile racial atmosphere created and perpetuated
by state segregation, which would have persisted even if segregated public schools had provided
genuinely equal educational facilities.9
Wisconsin v. Yoder also sounds in atmospheric harm.10 Yoder upheld the free exercise
rights of Amish parents to withdraw their children from public high school in violation of state
compulsory attendance laws, in part because attendance would have made it significantly more
difficult for these parents to teach Amish religious values to their children.11 The Court accepted
the parents’ argument that transmission of their way of life to the next generation depended upon
the ability to insulate their children from the worldly influences of a public high school.12

This conclusion is controversial because the Court supported it with citations to nowdiscredited social science research.
9

See Paul Brest, The Supreme Court, 1975 Term–Foreword: In Defense of the
Antidiscirmination Principle, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1976) (arguing that “[d]ecisions based on
assumptions of intrinsic worth and selective indifference” don’t simply deny valuable
opportunities to racial minorities, but also “inflict psychological injury by stigmatizing their
victims as inferior”).
10

406 U.S. 205 (1972).

11

406 U.S. at 211 (“Formal high school education beyond the eighth grade is contrary to
Amish beliefs, not only because it places Amish children in an environment hostile to Amish
beliefs . . . , but also because it takes them away from their community, physically and
emotionally, during the crucial and formative adolescent period of life.”); accord id. at 218; see
also id. at 212 (quoting expert testimony that forcing Amish children to attend a public high
school would “ultimately result in the destruction of the Old Order Amish church community as
it exists in the United States today”).
12

See 406 U.S. at 235.
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The notion of atmospheric harm has also been invoked in cases involving regulation of
sexually explicit speech. The Court has held, for example, that in addition to protecting minors
and nonconsenting adults, such regulation advances legitimate state interests in protecting “the
quality of life and the total community environment,” as well as the “the tone of commerce in the
great city centers.”13 Similarly, the Court has relied on the atmospheric harm of sexually explicit
speech in upholding a city’s confinement of adult movie theaters to a single zone, as a legitimate
means of protecting “the quality of life in the community at large.”14
These isolated examples aside, however, atmospheric harms generally have not fared well
in constitutional litigation. With few exceptions, the interests protected by constitutional law
must be tangible, if not physical.15 For example, a discrimination claim from the early 1970s

13

Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973); accord id. (quoting Alexander
Bickel, 22 PUB. INT. 25-26 (Winter 1971) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
[The dissemination of pornography] concerns the tone of the society, the mode, or
to use terms that have perhaps greater currency, the style and quality of life, now and in
the future. A man may be entitled to read an obscene book in his room, or expose himself
indecently there . . .. We should protect his privacy. But if he demands a right to obtain
the books and pictures he wants in the market, and to foregather in public places-discreet,
if you will, but accessible to all-with others who share his tastes, then to grant him his
right is to affect the world about the rest of us, and to impinge on other privacies. Even
supposing that each of us can, if he wishes, effectively avert the eye and stop the ear
(which, in truth, we cannot), what is commonly read and seen and heard and done
intrudes upon us all, want it or not.
Id.
14

City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 55 (1986).

15

Cf. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (holding that the
“irreducible constitutional minimum” for Article III standing includes plaintiff’s pleading and
proof of defendant’s “invasion of a legally protected interest which is concrete and particularized,
and actual or imminent,” rather than merely “conjectural”) (internal quotation marks, citations,
and parenthetical numbering omitted)
-9-

established that an illicit government purpose to discriminate on the basis of race,
unaccompanied by a discriminatory racial effect, does not constitute an actionable constitutional
harm under the Equal Protection Clause.16 More recently, the Court has held that expression of a
community’s moral disapproval of same-sex intimacy is insufficient to justify criminalization of
such intimacy between consenting adults in the privacy of their home.17 Hate speech outside of
the workplace is protected by the Speech Clause unless it is likely to provoke immediate violence
or constitutes a genuine threat of violence,18 and even within the workplace is protected so long
as it does not rise (or rather sink) to the level at which it is “so severe, pervasive, and objectively
offensive” that it creates a discriminatory effect, such as “overt, physical deprivation of access to
school resources.”19 Neither the atmospheric harm to racial minorities stemming from the

16

See Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971) (holding that Mississippi city that closed
all of its previously whites-only swimming pools, and reclassified its previously blacks-only
swimming pool as open to all city residents, did not violate the Equal Protection Clause); see
also id. at 224 (“[N]o case in this Court has held that a legislative act may violate equal
protection solely because of the motivations of the men who voted for it.”) (plurality opinion of
Black, J.); see also Ruth Colker, Anti-Subordination Above All: Sex, Race, and Equal Protection,
61 NYU L. REV. 1003, 1007 (1986) (contrasting the now-dominant “equal opportunity”
conception of equal protection with the “anti-subordination” conception, which “seeks to
eliminate the power disparities between men and women, and between whites and non-whites,
through the development of laws and policies that directly redress them”).
17

See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 571-72 (2003); compare id. at 599 (“The Texas
[anti-sodomy] statute seeks to further the belief of its citizens that certain forms of sexual
behavior are ‘immoral and unacceptable’ . . . .”) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Bowers v.
Hardwick).
18

See, e.g., Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359-60 (2003) (declaring that Speech Clause
permits the criminalization of “fighting words” and “true threats”).
19

See, e.g. Davis v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 650 (1999); accord 526
U.S. at 651 (To prevail on an implied private action under Title IX, ”a plaintiff must establish
sexual harassment of students that is so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive, and that so
undermines and detracts from the victim’s education experience, that the victim-students are
-10-

expression of government animus towards them, nor that to moral conservatives created by decriminalization of what they consider to be immoral acts, nor the humiliation and insult suffered
by the objects of hate speech, suffices to support a constitutional claim in the absence of direct
harm to traditional conceptions of individual life, liberty, or property.
Even the apparently exceptional decisions that seem to recognize atmospheric harms
mean less than one might think. The atmospheric holding of Brown has not generally taken hold
in equal protection doctrine; as attested by the abandonment of busing and other aggressive
techniques of integration, post-Brown racial equal protection doctrine has been primarily aimed
at ensuring the opportunities afforded by equal racial access, not at the result of a racially
integrated social environment.20 Wisconsin v. Yoder has not appreciably strengthened parental
rights to shield their children from purportedly immoral or anti-religious atmospheres in the
public schools,21 and regulation of sexually explicit speech continues to be primarily based on
traditional harms to children and nonconsenting adults, rather than on the tenor or tone of society

effectively denied equal access to an institution’s resources and opportunities.”).
20

See, e.g., Parents Involved in Comm. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701
(2007) (invalidating nonremedial use of race-conscious measures to achieve integration by
school districts that had never been de jure segregated or that had achieved racially unitary status
after history of de jure segregation); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003) (invalidating
nonremedial use of mechanical racial preference to achieve racial diversity in public university
that had never been de jure segregated).
21

See, e.g., Brown v. Hot, Sexy & Safer Prods., Inc., 68 F.3d 525, 538-39 (10th Cir. 1995)
(rejecting parental claim that compulsory student attendance at a high school AIDS awareness
assembly involving sexually explicit language and demonstrations violated parental free exercise
and education rights), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1159 (1996); Mozert v. Hawkins Cty. Bd. Educ.,
827 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1987) (same with respect to school district’s refusal to excuse students
from reading texts which contradicted religious beliefs of students and their parents), cert.
denied, 484 U.S. 1066 (1988).
-11-

that such speech may be said to undermine.22
B.

The Establishment Clause
In contrast to the rest of constitutional rights law, the Establishment Clause is sympathetic

to atmospheric claims. Valid Establishment Clause claims are not confined to state action that
prevents people from acting in a particular way, or that threatens religiously discriminatory
government action or private ownership or control of persons or property. To the contrary,
successful Establishment Clause claims frequently turn on whether state interactions with
religion make religious minorities feel excluded, on whether such interactions imply that such
minorities do not truly belong to some relevant “community” or “society,” even if there is no
exclusion in physical fact.
For example, the Lemon test,23 terminally ill but still formally alive, has long held that
state action lacking a plausible secular purpose violates the Establishment Clause, even when
such legislation does not appear to constrain or coerce individual actions.24 By contrast, the

22

See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 534 (2002) (holding that virtual
child pornography is fully protected by the Speech Clause because its production and
dissemination does not involve, and thus does not directly harm, actual children).
23

403 U.S. 602, 613 (1971) (holding that for a statute to conform to the Establishment
Clause, it must have “a secular legislative purpose,” and a “principal or primary effect . . . that
neither advances nor inhibits religion, and must avoid fostering “an excessive government
entanglement with religion”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
24

Aguillard v. Edwards, 482 U.S. 578 (1987) (invalidating for lack of a secular purpose
statutory mandate that creationism be taught in public schools whenever evolution is taught);
Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985) (same regarding mandatory moment of silence in public
schools); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (same regarding passive display of Ten
Commandments in public school hallway); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968) (same
regarding state initiative that prohibited teaching of any theory of human origin in public
schools).
-12-

Court’s abortive attempt to narrow the reach of the Clause by introduction of a decidedly
nonatmospheric “coercion” element into anti-establishment claims was a short-lived failure.25
The currently dominant “endorsement test” positively constitutionalizes atmospheric
harm under the Establishment Clause. Among other things, the endorsement test prohibits state
action taken with the specific intent to aid religion, as well as action lacking such an intent that
nevertheless reasonably appears to aid religion; both constitute constitutional violations even
though these actions frequently do not constitute tangible aid to religion beyond creation of a
certain community atmosphere that favors some religions over others, or belief over unbelief.
Actual or apparent endorsements of religion are often unaccompanied by any government action
that violates individual rights or otherwise constrains constitutionally protected personal
interests; rather, it is the mere knowledge that the government prefers certain kinds of believers
over others, or believers over nonbelievers, that constitutes the constitutional violation, even if
the government does not act on that preference. So the climate of evangelical favoritism created
by a program of high school football invocations,26 or the possibility that a graduation prayer

25

See, e.g., City & Cty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 659-61 (1989) (Kennedy,
J., joined by Rhenquist, C.J., and White & Scalia, JJ., concurring in the result in part and
dissenting in part) (arguing that coercion is a necessary element of an Establishment Clause
claim).
One might argue that coercion still remains a formal element of every Establishment
Clause claim, but the Court’s determination that even the faintest whiff of endorsement
constitutes psychological coercion means that the element doesn’t do any meaningful doctrinal
work. See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992) (striking down graduation prayer based in
part on the psychological pressure that group devotional prayer exerts on middle- and highschool students). As Professor Siegel pointed out at the workshops, however, a more robust and
meaningful coercion test may make a comeback now that its principal proponent, Justice
Kennedy, has replaced Justice O’Connor as the deciding vote on most Religion Clause cases.
26

See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000).
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might have nudged nonbelieving or nonpracticing students to stand up while it was delivered,27
or the possible message of Christian preference sent by a passive monument of the Ten
Commandments in a county courthouse,28 all constitute serious violations of the Establishment
Clause despite being purely atmospheric harms.
Atmospheric harms can even appear on both sides of an Establishment Clause
controversy. Recent controversies over the proposed teaching of “scientific creationism” or
“intelligent design” along with neo-Darwinism in the public schools involved an atmosphere of
support for a theologically conservative cosmology hostile to unbelief and theologically liberal
Christianity (when creationism is taught as an alternative to neo-Darwinism), against a secular
atmosphere dismissive of this cosmology (when it is not).29
IV. CONCLUSION: THE PERSISTING CONSTITUTIONAL UNIQUENESS OF RELIGION?
It’s hard to know what to make of the embrace of atmospheric harm by Establishment
Clause doctrine, when most of the rest of constitutional law discounts it as constitutionally
inactionable. One possibility is that religious belief is special–especially worthy of protection,
yet especially prone to generate discrimination, persecution, and other antisocial consequences.
This indeed seemed to be the constitutional trade-off in Establishment Clause doctrine for several
decades: Religion received special constitutional protection under the Free Exercise Clause, but

27

See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992).

28

See McCreary Cty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844 (2005).

29

See Kitzmiller v. Dover Area Sch. Dist., 400 F.Supp.2d 707, 728-29 (M.D.Pa. 2005)
(finding that the introduction of “intelligent design” into the public school classroom “sets up
what will be perceived by students as a ‘God-friendly’ science, one that explicitly mentions an
intelligent designer, and that the ‘other science,’ evolution, takes no position on religion”).
-14-

was subject to special constitutional constraints under the Establishment Clause.30 but that
apparent compromise has been almost completely dismantled in recent years. Religiously
motivated actions are no longer entitled to special protection under the Free Exercise Clause,31
and financial and other tangible aid directed to religion by participants in social welfare programs
using with secular eligibility criteria no longer violates the Establishment Clause.32 In both these
circumstances, atmospheric harm no longer counts as a constitutional harm.
There is, however, one major remaining area of Establishment Clause doctrine in which
atmospheric harms still seem relevant–namely, state appropriation of religious symbols and
practices.33 As Pleasant Grove City v. Summum illustrates,34 these cases are almost never about

30

See, e.g., Abner S. Green, The Political Balance of the Religion Clauses,102 Yale L.J.
1611 (1993); Michael E. Smith, The Special Place of Religion in the Constitution, 1984 SUP. CT.
REV. 83.
31

See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).

Much religious exercise still receives special protection as a statutory constitutional right.
See, e.g., Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 § 3(b), 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(b) (providing
that government action that burdens the free exercise of religion must satisfy strict scrutiny),
invalidated as to state government action by City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997);
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 §§ 2(a)(1), 3(a), 42 U.S.C. §§
2000cc(a)(1), 2000cc-1(a) (same with respect to state government action relating to land use or
persons in government custody); Religious Freedom Act, ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1493.01 (same
with respect to Arizona government action).
32

See Zelman v. Harris-Simmons, 536 U.S. 639 (2002) (upholding voucher program that
resulted in assistance to private religious schools, where criteria for participation were secularly
defined and vouchers were directed to private schools by the choices of individual students or
their parents) ; Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S.793 (2000) (declining to strike down in-kind aid to
parochial schools based upon the mere possibility that it might be diverted to sectarian uses,
where aid was received as part of general program of assistance to K-12 education) (plurality
opinion).
33

For detailed discussions of the persisting special doctrinal treatment of religion in this
area of Establishment Clause doctrine, see Frederick Mark Gedicks, A Two-Track Theory of
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state action that harms “concrete” individual interests or interferes with the actual exercise of
individual autonomy. Rather, the endorsement test makes the constitutionality of state
deployment of religious symbols or practices turns on whether the state is sending a message of
metaphysical inclusion or exclusion when it appropriates a symbol or practice. As Justice
O’Connor put it in originally articulating the test, “Endorsement sends a message to
nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the political community, and an
accompanying message to adherents that they are insider, favored members of the political
community. Disapproval sends the opposite message.”35 To date, the Court has generally held
that government appropriation of such symbols violate the Establishment Clause if they have a
nontrivial religious content that is not neutralized or balanced by secular symbols.36 So even
though other areas of Religion Clause doctrine have shifted to an understanding of religion that

Establishment Clause Doctrine, 43 B.C. L. REV. 1071 (2002); Frederick Mark Gedicks,
Neutrality in Establishment Clause Jurisprudence: Its Past and Future, in CHURCH-STATE
RELATIONS IN CRISIS: DEBATING NEUTRALITY 191 (Stephen V. Monsma ed. 2002).
34

483 F.3d 1044 (10th Cir.) (holding that city’s refusal to allow minority religion’s
monument in city park that contained display of the Ten Commandments together with secular
monuments constituted unconstitutional viewpoint- or content-based discrimination under the
Speech Clause), rev’d, 129 S.Ct. 1125 (2009) (holding that city’s installation of the Ten
Commandments in the park was government speech as to which the city could constitutionally
discriminate on the basis of content).
35

Lynch v. Donnelley, 465 U.S. 665, 688 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring).

36

See, e.g., Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005) (Ten Commandments monument
installed on state capitol grounds among numerous secular monuments did not violate
Establishment Clause); City & Cty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989) (free-standing
Christmas nativity scene in city-county building violated Establishment Clause, but Jewish
menorah displayed next to giant Christmas tree did not); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984)
(Christmas nativity scene surrounded by clowns, candy canes, Santa Claus, and reindeer did not
violate Establishment Clause).
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simply folds it into the general set of (less-protected) conscientious human activities, the Court’s
willingness to take note of atmospheric harm in religious symbol and practice cases suggests that
there still remains something constitutionally distinct about religious belief and practice.
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